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Why Equality? On Justifying Liberal Egalitarianism 
 
Paul Kelly 
 
London School of Economics 
 
Abstract: The debate over the nature of egalitarianism has come to 
dominate political philosophy. As ever more sophisticated attempts are made 
to describe the principles of an egalitarian distribution or to specify the good 
or goods that should be distributed equally, little is said about the 
fundamental basis of equality. In virtue of what should people be regarded as 
equal? Egalitarians have tended to dismiss this question of fundamental 
equality. In the first part of the paper I will examine some of these strategies 
of marginalisation and assess whether the issue of fundamental equality 
matters. Jeremy Waldron has criticised this strategy of avoidance in his 
recent book God, Locke and Equality. He argues that Locke’s turn to a 
theistic grounding for fundamental equality provides a better approach to the 
problem than the approach taken by contemporary liberals such as John 
Rawls.  I will examine Waldron’s critique of Rawls and show that it is 
wanting. I will conclude by suggesting that Rawls’ approach to the issue has 
a bearing on the way in which equality should be understood as a political 
value. This argument for the primacy of a political conception of 
egalitarianism has a bearing on the interconnection between core liberal 
values and the idea of the state that has been emphasised by Rawls, Dworkin 
and Nagel.  
 
1. Defending egalitarianism 
 
It is customary to credit Rawls with resurrecting normative political theory 
with the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. Others might make a 
case for Brian Barry’s Political Argument of 1965. However one wants to 
explain it, it is clear that something happens in the late sixties or early 
seventies that marks a move away from the modest application of linguistic 
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philosophy to the analysis political concepts, and towards the form of 
normative theorising we find dominant today. Political philosophy has come 
to be associated with the development of liberal egalitarian theories 
associated with the names of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Brian Barry and 
their criticism by the likes of G.A. Cohen. Egalitarianism provides the 
backdrop to increasingly technical questions about responsibility and choice 
versus circumstances, on the one hand and resources, access to advantage or 
primary goods on the other. Egalitarianism of the form we find in Rawls 
provides the paradigm within which normal political philosophy is carried 
on.  Various summaries of these debates are provided under such headings 
as ‘Equality of What?’1 or ‘On The Currency of Egalitarian Justice’2. Each 
suggests that the real issue is the question of what should be equalised – 
income, resources, primary good, rights, welfare or opportunities for 
advantage. There is no doubt that these are serious questions deserving of 
attention from political philosophers and theorists. For example, does it 
make sense to describe oneself as an egalitarian without some clear idea of 
what one thinks should be equalised and what should not? But some 
philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin have suggested that these are not only 
                                                 
1 Taken from the title of A. Sen’s Tanner Lecture on Human Values in 1980. 
2 The title of an equally famous article by G.A. Cohen, ‘On The Currency of Egalitarian 
Justice’, Ethics, vol. 99, (1989) pp. 906-44. 
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important questions, but in some sense these are the fundamental questions 
for egalitarians. The reason for this is that a more fundamental sense of 
equality is assumed by all the rival candidate theories that one finds in 
modern politics. The differences between such theories are not differences 
between those who regard mankind as equals and those who believe in racial 
or hierarchical political theories, rather they are differences over how 
equality of the relevant kind may be achieved. In this general sense every 
serious candidate theory is concerned with equality, the interesting 
differences between theories concern answers to questions such as ‘Equality 
of What?’ or ‘The Currency of Egalitarian Justice’.3 Some will argue that 
the only goods to be distributed equally are basic rights to life, liberty and 
property, others will focus on social primary goods without which no decent 
life is possible, others still will try and cash-out the conditions of a valuable 
life in terms of a bundle of resources which individuals can use differently in 
pursuing their preferred conceptions of the good life. On this Dworkinian 
view the broad commitment to equality of concern and respect is the only 
game in town, what matters for politics and for political theorists is which 
candidate theory of egalitarianism can see off its opponents. This insight 
                                                 
3 The exploration of this Dworkinian idea forms the principle narrative of W. Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd edn., Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, pp. 2-5. 
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seems to capture an important aspect of the practice of political philosophy 
where theory construction and criticism is what political theorists do.4  But 
more importantly Dworkin’s argument shifts the meaning of egalitarian from 
those who believe in basic equality (as he claims that pretty much everyone 
believes in equality now) to a more specific answer to the ‘currency’ and 
‘equality of what’ questions. For Dworkin liberal egalitarians are those who 
endorse the idea of equality of resources, for non-liberal egalitarians such as 
G.A. Cohen, egalitarians endorse the idea of equality of access to advantage.  
 
The main consequence of the trend that Dworkin identifies and advocates is 
that it pays scant attention to more traditional questions about the basis of 
fundamental equality, or why we should be interested in equality in the first 
place. Some philosophers have cast a sceptical eye at Dworkin’s account of 
the terms of political debate amongst liberals, in particular Joseph Raz has 
made much of the supposed emptiness of the Dworkinian account of 
equality of concern and respect, yet Raz’s warning seems to have been 
largely sidestepped.5 This is no doubt in part because Raz does not think 
much can be made of the idea of basic of fundamental equality as anything 
                                                 
4 A fact that is lamented in Brian Barry’s Why Social Justice Matters? Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2005. Barry suggests in this book that too much political theory is narrowly inward 
looking and that egalitarians would be more profitably employed looking at how real 
equality can be achieved in modern democratic societies such as the UK and the US. 
5 See J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, chapter 9.  
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other than a principle of closure around a group of ‘equals’. As such equality 
is secondary to the substantive characteristic shared by the group of ‘equals’ 
such that again the real issue is one of significance (what matters) and only 
then, of how it is distributed. And what matter is usually personhood cashed 
out in terms of autonomy. 
 
Most contemporary political philosophers seem to accept either Dworkin’s 
position or a variation of Raz’s. Barry for example, assumes fundamental 
equality, as the starting point of his ‘Scanlonian contractualism’ but says 
nothing about why we should accept it.6 For Barry, basic equality is an 
axiom from which other things can be deduced or inferred and the success or 
attractiveness of these inferences is what will confirm and support the initial 
axiom. Such an approach has some common-sense plausibility in that 
anyone who seriously objects to the equal claims of other human beings is 
unlikely to be worried about the nature of social justice and therefore with 
reading Barry’s books. 
 
                                                 
6 B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 70, and B. Barry, 
‘Something in the Disputation Not Unpleasant’, in Paul Kelly ed. Impartiality, Neutrality 
and Justice, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998, p. ? 
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The other common approach to the problem of basic equality in the 
literature, which can be illustrated by the example of T.M. Scanlon, is the 
abandonment of the search for a single unified conception of equality as a 
value characteristic shared by all individuals and instead its replacement 
with a re-description of what egalitarians want in terms of a cluster of 
distinct but related moral commitments. These moral commitments can be 
illustrated by the diversity of reasons for rejecting inequalities.7 Scanlon 
provides subtle and insightful discussions of what is wrong with suffering 
and severe deprivation, stigmatizing differences in status, unacceptable 
domination, procedural unfairness and unfair outcomes. These diverse faces 
of objectionable inequality depend on values other than basic equality of 
concern and respect and suggest that it is particular types of inequality that 
are wrong and not necessarily inequality per se.  This approach is shared by 
many philosophers, who agree with Scanlon that it is both more sensitive to 
our moral experience whilst allowing us to challenge objectionable social 
and political practices.  
 
What both approaches suggest is that not much turns on the idea of basic 
equality – or that in virtue of which we are worthy of equality of concern 
                                                 
7 T.M. Scanlon, ‘The Diversity of Objections to Inequality’, reprinted in M. Clayton and 
A. Williams, The Ideal of Equality, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 41-59. 
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and respect – and therefore that political theory can proceed without paying 
the idea much attention. What really matters is the internal analysis and 
critique of particular theories in the attempt to converge upon a position that 
merits support because it has seen off all of the available contenders. This 
strategy has some attractions in terms of how we do political theory. If every 
time we wished to address what is wrong with unjust social arrangements or 
policies we had to build a theory from the ground up, we would never make 
any contribution to wider political and moral debate. To demand this fully 
foundationalist approach of political philosophers seems to make no more 
sense then requiring biologists or chemists to do fundamental work in basic 
physics before advancing any hypotheses in their own fields of enquiry.  So 
political philosophers can seek to make some progress in debates between 
luck-egalitarians, sufficientarians, prioritarians and humanitarians by the 
internal analysis and criticism of their arguments, presuppositions and 
implications. This is one strategy employed by many political philosophers.8 
Yet the question remains whether it is ultimately insufficient as a complete 
defence of a political principle that may be used to justify coercion in the 
real world of politics, or at least will claim to justify such coercion. The 
                                                 
8 Indeed it is a strategy I have used myself in Liberalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004. 
It can also be found in Jeremy Bentham’s attempt to provide an informal justification of 
the primacy of the principle of utility in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation. [(1789)]. See the discussion in R. Harrison, Bentham, London, Routledge, 
1983, pp. 187-8. 
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reason for this is that showing that a particular perspective can withstand a 
critical engagement with other theories cannot show its uniqueness as the 
right basis for social cooperation and political coercion. This is because a 
theory’s unique ability to withstand critical challenge depends upon being 
able to set limits to the range of possible rival candidate theories. In the case 
of arguments for egalitarianism these rival theories will not only be 
alternative egalitarian theories up to and including utilitarianism but also the 
whole range of non-egalitarian arguments and theories. Just as the strategy 
of internal analysis and criticism will not single out the uniqueness of 
egalitarianism amongst its rivals so similarly it will not provide support to 
the idea of fundamental equality, as there is no non-question begging sense 
in which egalitarianism must win out over non-egalitarian theories.  
 
2. Do we need an account of Basic Equality? 
 
A question we might ask ourselves at this point is whether it really matters 
that we do not provide a justification or defence of fundamental equality? I 
am interested in the question of why we should regard other (all?) human 
beings as equals. My interest and the point of this question is not the search 
for a universal motivation to act morally although clearly if we can find a 
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ground for regarding other human beings as moral equals this will have a 
bearing on questions of the scope and demands of our obligations. Rather I 
am concerned with why we should be concerned with basic equality in the 
first place and what an appropriate concern for basic equality would look 
like. This question is certainly concerned with the scope of our obligations 
and this does seem to be central to the concerns of contemporary political 
philosophy.  So at least in this sense the issue of basic equality does seem to 
matter the question to be answered is what is basic equality and how does it 
have a bearing on scope?  
 
There are three main reasons why the question of basic equality might well 
matter and therefore why it should merit some equal attention amongst those 
political philosophers who regard themselves as egalitarian.9  
 
The first reason is the most obvious and concerns the ability of egalitarians 
to say something to anti-egalitarians, Nietzscheans and the defenders of 
natural aristocracy. Although most contemporary political philosophy is 
conducted against the background of a weak commitment to equality of 
                                                 
9 I am not suggesting that there should be a complete redirection of attention from 
questions about the currency of egalitarian justice or the nature of what should be 
distributed. All I am suggesting is that some attention should be given to this fundamental 
question as well, and that certainly seems to be lacking in the contemporary literature. 
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concern and respect it is certainly not the case that everyone accepts this 
premise. It is certainly not the case that in the wider world egalitarianism is 
the norm, whatever Dworkin might claim. As well as the unattractive claims 
of racists, misogynists and homophobes, many people do think that there are 
ethically relevant differences between people that undermine the idea of 
basic equality. These anti-egalitarian claims can be based on prejudice but it 
is not a sign of prejudice as such that one rejects basic equality, as many 
egalitarians deny that all departures from equality are morally significant. 
Some inequalities can be egalitarian.  
 
The rejection of egalitarianism can take many forms. Some might argue that 
there are no grounds for attributing equal worth to persons in any respect, 
because there are no grounds for attributing moral worth to persons as such. 
Followers of Nietzsche fall into this group. They see the claims of equality 
as part of the ‘slave morality’ legacy of Christianity, which in its attempt to 
overcome natural hierarchy undermines the status of any ethical values and 
leaves us with nihilism.10 For the nihilist anything goes because every claim 
to value is the assertion of the will to power. The Nietzschean challenge is 
similar to the challenge of the amoralist, to whom perhaps no general answer 
                                                 
10 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Harmondworth, Penguin books, 2003. 
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to the question why be moral can be given. But the challenge for the 
egalitarian is also different, because even if we can give some kind of ethical 
response to the Nietzschean, of the sort that he too is involved in a kind of 
ethical practice, it does not follow that this response will result in equal 
concern and respect. 
 
Not all anti-egalitarians are nihilists or Nietzsche inspired relativists. Some 
philosophers take a realist but anti-egalitarian view, a good example is John 
Kekes. Kekes rubbishes basic equality on its own grounds by claiming that 
because egalitarians do not take seriously the issue of evil they are unable to 
see why some people are less worthy of moral consideration than others and 
hence are not in the relevant sense equals. He gives the examples of 
torturers, murderers and concentration camp guards as the sort of people 
who show through their actions that they are less worthy of consideration 
than others.11 Kekes’s argument is important, in at least this respect, in that 
he argues against prescriptive or moral equality, whilst potentially conceding 
the case in favour of descriptive equality.  Thus all people may satisfy some 
natural criterion of equality as human beings (all having interests) yet fail to 
satisfy the relevant criteria of moral equality because of the repugnance of 
                                                 
11 J. Kekes, The Illusions of Egalitarianism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003. 
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their acts and motives. It is at least arguable that certain kinds of person are 
not worthy of equal consideration even if we decline to deny them any 
protection of the law. We might for example find some people so repugnant 
in their acts, (torturers are a good example) that we deny them equal concern 
and respect in any meaningful sense, and the only reason we do not allow 
them to become total moral outlaws is the concern not to demean ourselves 
rather than any concern for their status. 
 
Without some criterion of basic equality we have no way of responding to 
the challenge of anti-egalitarians and this fact is perhaps more pressing today 
than for many years because of the unfortunate consequences of the so-
called war on terror and the clash of civilisations thesis. It is too easy to 
dismiss such people as beyond the pale and therefore not deserving of 
serious consideration. If egalitarianism is only of interest to other 
egalitarians then it is unlikely to have much impact beyond the confines of 
the seminar room. 
 
Yet the problem is not simply that egalitarians will have little to say to the 
wider world of anti-egalitarianism. The problem is also one of consistency. 
Egalitarians cannot accuse anti-egalitarians of missing a crucial point of 
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moral significance if they are themselves going to avoid any justification and 
explanation of the grounds of equal treatment. The Dworkinian view is to 
reject as candidates for serious consideration, principles and policies that are 
systematically anti-egalitarian such as racial discrimination on the grounds 
that it fails to acknowledge a basic parameter of ethics. Yet this argument is 
seriously weakened if there is no attempt to explain and defend the basis of 
that ethical parameter. If, one steps-back from righteous indignation and 
asks dispassionately what is the anti-egalitarian missing, we find the 
importance of making some case for basic equality. The anti-egalitarian can 
want many of the things that egalitarians want, but differ only in that he 
wants them for the morally worthy. This is not quite the position taken by 
Kekes who wants to reject substantive egalitarianism as well, but it is one 
that could be based on his anti-egalitarian argument from evil. There is no 
good reason for the anti-egalitarian to reject the idea that once one has 
weeded out all the torturers and other evildoers, amongst the remainder 
equality might be the appropriate grounds of moral and political recognition. 
This is not unlike the idea of equality between equals that we find in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Here the idea is that amongst those sharing 
the appropriate quality or excellence there should be equality of treatment, 
so that, for example, amongst able violinists, violins should be equally 
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distributed. This form of egalitarianism is consistent with most forms of 
elitism and political systems such as aristocracy.  
 
This brings us to the third reason for providing an account of basic or 
fundamental equality namely the problem of scope. As we have just seen 
some of those who claim to reject egalitarianism could with consistency 
accept a form of egalitarianism as equality amongst equals. The question of 
the scope of egalitarian principles is therefore very important as how we 
define the scope of basic equality seems to have a direct bearing on the 
nature of egalitarian principles. Just as we could reconstruct the anti-
egalitarian argument of Kekes so that it is consistent with allowing 
egalitarianism amongst a suitably circumscribed group of worthy 
individuals, so in the case of most other egalitarian principles we could 
circumscribe the group to whom they are supposed to apply. This is not 
merely an unintentional consequence of egalitarian arguments for one of the 
central debates in liberal political theory concerns the question of the scope 
of liberal egalitarian political principles. If we take Rawls’ theory as an 
example we can see how the argument of A Theory of Justice,12 was 
assumed to have a broadly cosmopolitan scope, yet that in Political 
                                                 
12 See especially the interpretation of Rawls theory in C. Beitz, Political Theory and 
International Relations,  rev. edn., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 
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Liberalism and A Law of Peoples,13 the egalitarian principles of ‘justice as 
fairness’ are clearly supposed to apply to the members of ‘a people’ rather 
than to all people as such. Some have accused Rawls of apostasy in moving 
from his cosmopolitan to communitarian conception of liberalism, but 
arguably Rawls always claimed that equality in the relevant sense is 
something appropriate to those who share in the same scheme social 
cooperation and he is not alone amongst egalitarian liberals in holding such 
a view.14 So at the heart of modern liberalism we already have ethical 
distinctions between individuals. Some of these distinctions can no doubt be 
explained via the institutional division of labour between political equality, 
which clearly presupposes membership of a polity, economic equality, 
which assumes some form of social and economic cooperation and more 
basic forms of equality, which simply depend on common humanity. But 
that is not sufficient if we are to prioritize the respective claims of these 
various forms of equal treatment. Do the claims of individuals as such, to be 
equals, trump the claims of co-operators or members of the same ethical 
community? As this issue is precisely what separates cosmopolitan from 
                                                 
13 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, and A 
Law of Peoples, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1999.  
14 See for example, T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’ Philosophy and Public 
Affairs,  33 (2005), pp. 113-147. Although I have not be able to find a clear statement in 
his writings Ronald Dworkin claimed in a conversation with the author that there was no 
such thing as international justice. Presumably the point is that whatever equality exists 
beyond border is different from what exists amongst those within a political community. 
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other kinds of egalitarian, I do not see how we can make much in the way of 
progress without addressing the basis and character of fundamental 
equality.15  The issue of the scope of equality versus ideas that may be more 
fundamental such as humanity is precisely what is being debated amongst 
defenders and critics of cosmopolitan egalitarianism.  
 
For all of the reasons given above it is clear that the issue of basic equality is 
something that egalitarians should not ignore as it affects the scope and 
therefore the plausibility of the arguments they make about ‘currency’ and 
‘distributive principles’. One of the few political philosophers who have 
sought to address head on the issue of basic equality is Jeremy Waldron. He 
writes; 
 Basic equality is so fundamental to innumerable aspects of our 
ethical outlook that it requires a special sort of defense – at once 
transcendent and powerful – so that it can both underpin what are 
usually taken to be the starting points of public justification and also 
                                                 
15 I am aware that most cosmopolitans will answer that they do have a conception of 
basic equality which gives priority to humanity over other forms of ethical relationship, 
on the grounds that they are concerned with humanities equal status as the bearer of 
interests. This is however too quick as the idea of human interests is still controversial, 
indeed it is partly what theories of egalitarian justice try to explain. Some accounts of 
basic interests might actually presuppose membership of certain kinds of communities, 
such as juridical states, in order for people to enjoy freedom.  
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prevail in the face of the various temptations that invite us to start 
drawing distinctions between types and grades of human being.16 
In the next section of the paper I propose to examine Waldron’s argument 
based on his reading of Locke and his use of this to mount a critique of the 
treatment of basic equality in contemporary liberalism such as that of John 
Rawls. Before turning to Waldron’s argument it is worthwhile just 
reminding our selves of the point of turning to basic or fundamental equality. 
The issue is in virtue of what are human beings deserving of equal 
consideration and respect? My point will not be to provide an 
unchallengeable defence of equality, rather the point will be to identify the 
nature of the claim to basic equality as only then will we be in a position to 
determine the requirements of any defence or justification of that claim. 
  
3. Basic Equality – Christian or Liberal? 
 
Waldron’s discussion of basic equality is developed in the context of his 
reinterpretation of Locke’s moral and political philosophy. One of the 
distinctive features of his argument is that Locke should be read as a 
philosopher who has potentially interesting things to say about fundamental 
                                                 
16 J. Waldron, God, Locke and Equality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p. 14. 
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philosophical problems and not merely as an historical curiosity. As such he 
challenges the interpretation of Cambridge historians such as Peter Laslett 
and John Dunn who both argue that because of Locke’s seventeenth century 
theological views there are no issues of contemporary political relevance 
about which we can learn anything from Locke.17 This means that we can 
both learn something about basic equality from Locke’s arguments but more 
controversially we do not have to discard Locke’s theological beliefs in 
order to learn from him. For Waldron, the discussion of basic equality is not 
merely a side issue in an historical discussion of a past political thinker: we 
can learn something about the ‘shape’ of basic equality from Locke that has 
a bearing on how we judge secular contemporary discussions of basic 
equality such as that notably offered by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. I 
do not intend to say anything here about Waldron’s methodology of 
historical enquiry or his critique of Cambridge historicism, other than to note 
that I am in broad agreement with him. Our primary concern is what we can 
learn about the ‘shape’ or nature of the criteria of fundamental equality. 
 
                                                 
17 See P.Laslett, ‘Introduction’ to John Locke, Two Treatises of Government ed. P. 
Laslett, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, and J. Dunn, The Political 
Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of ‘Two Treatises of 
Government’, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
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Locke is interesting for Waldron because he has a conception of the 
fundamental equality of all mankind in the Second Treatise as the bearers of 
rights and therefore of ethical significance. In this sense Locke too seems to 
fall into Dworkin’s claim that equality is the only game in town. What 
makes Locke interesting is how he seeks to cash out that claim.  Locke 
seems to both reject a straightforward species-based naturalism and appeal 
to the idea of the species as the principle of closure of his conception of 
moral significance.  
 
Human beings are not equal because they belong to the same species Man. 
And the reason for this argument is to be found in Locke’s account the 
concept or term species in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding18. In 
the Essay’ Locke rejects species terms as what he calls nominal essences. 
Nominal essences are collections of ideas derived from sensation and 
experience derived from nature. However, they are not based on real 
distinctions between objects of experience and therefore cannot provide the 
basis for real distinctions between species, and more importantly between 
mankind as a species and other kinds of species. The point about this is that 
our use of species terms cannot draw a real distinction between one species 
                                                 
18 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1971, III. vi.  
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and another, although it can identify some nature features of creatures which 
are not shared by all. How we distinguish these criteria is largely based on 
convention and practice and it is for that reason that species terms will not 
provide the right kind of distinctions and discriminations. We can see an 
intimation here of the kind of arguments used by defenders of animal rights 
or animal welfare such as Peter Singer. He would certainly not deny any 
differences between what we call species, but rather like Locke, would deny 
the significance of these basically conventional distinctions for real and 
morally relevant distinctions between classes of being.19 What we focus on 
in making such distinctions will draw the boundaries of moral significance 
and therefore who or what counts as an equal. Appealing the idea of a 
common species will not do the relevant work because the classification is 
conventional though based in nature but it is not given directly by nature. 
Names will not help us here.  
 
So much for the argument of the Essay, yet in the Two Treatises Locke does 
use the idea of the human species as the principle of closure of his account 
of ethical significance. This sets up and interesting historical question about 
                                                 
19 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
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the consistency of Locke’s works which I do not intend to pursue.20 Waldron 
suggests that Locke overcomes this apparent contradiction by weakening the 
status of the species based claim in the Two Treatises. 
 
According to Waldron, Locke does not assert the strong claim about species 
identity as the boundary marker of significance for the reasons he sets out in 
the Essay. Instead, he falls back on the less ambitious claim that the 
perceptible qualities that make up the nominal essence of the species 
Mankind do actually contain some real resemblances that allow us to draw a 
boundary around the group of equals as the group of human beings. The key 
features that he picks out are that human beings are corporeal beings and that 
they have the capacity to think rationally or (what he takes to be the same 
thing) abstractly. The emphasis on corporeal beings is important because it 
suggests that Locke is concerned with human selves or persons and not souls 
despite his obvious religious commitments. This criteria distinguishes 
human persons from any other kind of non-corporeal entity should they exist 
and whatever they might happen to be. This choice has the important 
                                                 
20 P. Laslett argues that Locke made no attempt to make the arguments of the Essay and 
the Two Treatises consistent, and to seek such consistency is to force interpretations upon 
Lockes’ works that they ultimately will not sustain.  
 22 
implication for Locke that despite his theological presuppositions the scope 
of his conception of morality is definitely humanist.  
 
The second characteristic that Locke identifies is the capacity for abstract 
thought or rationality. This immediately suggests one standard objection to 
all naturalistic attempts to ground ethical equality namely that not all of 
those we might include amongst ‘humankind’ express the capacity to think 
abstractly. One simple response would be to robustly deny that those who do 
not manifest that characteristic are moral equals. Thus infants, most children 
up to a certain age, many elderly people as well as those with mental 
disabilities, those in comas etc., would seem to fall outside the scope of 
moral equality. Yet many of these people are precisely the kind of people we 
would want to protect by according them moral equality. Locke does not 
take this view, instead according to Waldron, he uses the capacity to exhibit 
abstract rational thought as a range-property, an idea derived from Rawls 
which seems to fits Locke’s arguments about the scope of the capacity for 
abstract thought.21 The point about a range-property is that it allows for 
differences of degree within a range. Waldron illustrates Rawls’ point with 
                                                 
21 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev edn.,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 444. 
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the example of being in New Jersey.22 Both Hoboken and Princeton fall 
within the range concept though they differ in the degree to which they fall 
within the State of New Jersey. Hoboken is on the border with New York. It 
is falling within the range that matters for Waldron and Locke and not the 
degree. So although people differ in the degree to which they exhibit the 
capacity for abstract thought this does not matter from the point of view of 
identifying the relevant criterion of equality.  
 
But even if we can use the idea of the capacity for abstract thought amongst 
corporeal beings, Waldron’s account of Locke’s theory of basic equality 
seems to fall foul of the other standard criticism of naturalistic theories of 
ethics, namely how ethical significance is derived from what Locke 
concedes is a natural capacity, or how we move from descriptive to 
prescriptive equality? It is here that Locke’s argument takes a theological 
turn and it is at this point that Waldron also argues that the significance of 
the appeal to God becomes important for making sense of equal status and 
value.  
 
                                                 
22 J. Waldron, God, Locke and Equality, p. 77. 
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The argument works in the following way, the capacity of abstract reasoning 
is identified as significant, not simply because it is widely universally shared 
(though to differing degrees) by all human beings. Instead the significance 
of abstract reasoning is that it enables each person to understand themselves 
as a part of the created order and from this they can reason to their obligation 
to preserve that order including other moral equals as part of the basic moral 
obligation we have to God. The idea seems to be as there is something rather 
than nothing there must have been a creator and therefore, a purpose to that 
creation of which human agents are a part. As soon as they ask themselves 
why have they been endowed uniquely with this capacity for abstract 
thought they will begin on an easy process of reasoning to the idea of a 
created order that gives a purpose and therefore a meaning to the possession 
and exercise of these capacities. 
 
There are a number of important points to note from Waldron’s account of 
Locke’s theory. Firstly, a straightforward appeal to a natural property will 
not be sufficient to ground basic equality. Secondly, that natural capacity is a 
range property that admits of significant differences in degree. Thirdly, the 
appeal to God provides the important account of the significance of this 
capacity – what Waldron calls the ‘shape’ of basic equality.  It is important, 
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according to Waldron that Locke’s appeal to God is not for the traditional 
natural law idea of an authoritative sanction of our basic moral obligation. 
Clearly, for Locke, God does sanction the basic moral law of equal respect, 
but that is not the key point. The appeal to God and therefore a transcendent 
authority, provides the meaning and significance of the real resemblances 
(corporeality and capacity for rationality) on which moral equality is based. 
Thus the appeal to God in the defence of basic equality is not merely a 
contingent fact of Locke’s historical circumstances that can be bracketed off 
from his ‘proper’ philosophical doctrines, it is central to his defence of 
equality. Yet Waldron also rejects the obvious contemporary response, 
which is that, if the defence of equality depends upon an appeal to God so 
much the worse for equality. It is hard enough trying to defend 
egalitarianism without having to defend the existence of God as Locke 
conceives him. It is precisely this source of transcendence that is 
significantly missing, according to Waldron in contemporary liberal theories 
of basic equality, and it is perhaps the embarrassment at having no such 
transcendent significance that causes liberals to fall back on either silence or 
a muted appeal to individuals as bearers of interests.  
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Precisely what we are supposed to make of Waldron’s argument is carefully 
ambiguous. One could take the view that he is merely repeating the standard 
criticism of liberal theories to the effect that the bracketing strategy and the 
avoidance of substantive philosophical or metaphysical commitments is 
unsustainable.23 This is certainly part of Waldron’s critique of Rawls in this 
account of the Lockean alternative. But this familiar, though perhaps 
important, point is not all that Waldron is offering us. Although he provides 
a defence of Locke’s view that civil society cannot accommodate atheists, he 
does not expressly say that a belief in God is essential for those who count as 
moral equals – a view that is actually not so alien in modern democracies. 
Yet because Waldron wants to take Locke’s argument seriously it does look 
as though he does endorse the need for God and the transcendent to make 
sense of our commitment to basic equality. Without it we are no better than 
the Nietzscheans who have no interest in equality or morality.  
 
Where Waldron’s challenge to contemporary liberalism is most clear is his 
suggestion that Rawls’ defence of basic equality fails because it lacks the 
                                                 
23 A version of this argument can also be found in Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Taylor is concerned with the way in 
which the resources from which our modern conceptions of self-hood such as the free and 
equal subject of democratic citizenship are under threat in late modernity. His concern is 
that what he calls horizontal secularism is in danger of undercutting the support of values 
we cherish. This is precisely what Nietzsche predicted in his Beyond God and Evil and 
the Genealogy of Morality. 
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‘shape’ or transcendent account of meaning and significance that basic 
equality needs. There is no alternative to substantive philosophical, 
metaphysical and even theological arguments in providing a defence of basic 
equality.   Is Waldron right about Rawls and what does this tell us about the 
nature of fundamental equality? 
 
Let us remind ourselves what according to Waldron, Locke’s appeal to God 
does in respect of justifying basic equality. His key point is that the appeal to 
the idea of God and a divine purpose provides the sources of an 
interpretation of the natural capacities of corporeal rationality, which gives 
them their special status amongst the range of other possible real 
resemblances amongst mankind. It is the meaning of the natural capacities 
that matters. 
 
Rawls offers us an account of basic equality in terms of two features of 
moral personality, the capacity to form and pursue a conception of the good 
and the capacity for a sense of justice.24 These capacities are natural 
capacities but for Rawls they are also range properties, indeed as we have 
seen it was Rawls who introduces the notion. Consequently, people can 
                                                 
24 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn., p. 442. 
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manifest these capacities to a greater or lesser degree, thus covering the 
question of natural differences in intelligence and ability. It is also 
interesting that Rawls’ characterisation of the two basic characteristics of 
moral personality as range properties answers Kekes’s challenge about the 
egalitarians ability to take account of evil. For even Kekes’s examples of 
torturers and murderers still have these capacities despite attempting to 
overcome or ignore their importance. It is for this reason that Rawls and 
liberal egalitarians see no one as beyond the protection of the law, however 
heinous their crimes may be. In this Rawls’ position is also superior to that 
of Locke who as we have seen leaves atheists outside the law.  
 
So far Rawls’ position seems to mirror that attributed to Locke. Where they 
differ is on the issue of significance and meaning. Waldron claims that 
Rawls’s account of moral personality has no shape as Rawls rejects the idea 
of appealing to some transcendent significance of these characteristics of 
moral personality. But this argument seems a bit hasty. Rawls does provide 
an interpretation of the significance of moral personality but in so doing he 
does not appeal to some external source of authority or significance. Instead 
Rawls interpretation of the significance of moral personality is spelt out 
through the articulation of a full theory of equal treatment appropriate to the 
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kind of persons who find themselves in the initial choice situation of his 
theory of justice as fairness. This is similar to the strategy of analysis and 
criticism of candidate theories of egalitarianism that I identified in the first 
part of the paper. But the strategy of Rawls employs here is rather different 
in that Rawls sees part of the task of theory construction as specifying the 
nature of basic equality whilst the appeal to basic equality places constraints 
on the character of that theory construction. Theory construction and the 
strategy of reflective equilibrium are obviously important parts of Rawls’ 
account of the characteristic features of moral personality. The meaning and 
significance of the two basic features of moral personality is provided by the 
role they play in making sense of a just social order. Waldron’s challenge is 
whether the process of explaining basic equality in this way is sufficient? 
But in order to answer his challenge we need an account of sufficient for 
what? 
 
Waldron’s demand cannot be that Rawls sees off all challengers to his 
account of basic equality, as Waldron’s own Lockean theory is hardly likely 
to fair even as well as Rawls’s. For if Waldron argument is not merely for 
the development of a  philosophical anthropology before we can do political 
theory, but the more demanding claim that we need to take theology 
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seriously, then his position would seem far more precarious than Rawls’s. 
His argument does seem to play into the hands of the Nietzscheans by saying 
that equality depends upon a conception of God, but as we have no good 
arguments for belief in God we cannot sustain a conception of equality. 
Locke may well be providing us with an argument for basic equality but it is 
hardly one we should take very seriously. Rawls does not set the barrier of 
justification quite so high, so the idea of self-sufficiency in his account of 
basic equality must count as an advantage over Waldron and Locke. If the 
question is the role and purpose of basic equality it is not obvious that 
Waldron’s turn to the transcendent is necessary, although clearly some 
argument beyond the identification of a natural property is important. Where 
Waldron’s argument ultimately differs is on the issue of the sanction of basic 
equality, or why we should respect it. But this is a different question to how 
we identify the meaning and significance of basic equality, and it is one that 
depends on the existence of God for its answer. And this is something that 
Waldron does not prove.  
 
The question is whether Rawls’ approach is sufficient to address the claims 
of why basic equality matters. His approach certainly offers something to 
say to the anti-egalitarian about the nature of basic equality. Using the idea 
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of a range property he is able to address anti-egalitarians such as Kekes or 
others who deny the idea that there can be natural properties that include 
sufficient numbers to meet the aspirations of egalitarian theories. By 
providing an interpretation of the basic capacities of moral personality 
Rawls theory meets the demands of consistency in addressing alternative 
non-egalitarian theories. Finally there is the issue of scope. Here Rawls 
account of basic equality takes an interesting turn. He develops the idea of 
moral personality in the initial situation of establishing fair terms of social 
cooperation.25 The point seems to be that basic equality exists first and 
foremost amongst those engaged in constructing a fair scheme of social 
cooperation. What is not developed in this argument but what is increasingly 
clear in Rawls’ work is that basic equality is primarily a political notion that 
is articulated against the backdrop of a certain kind of political society – a 
just state.  This certainly goes some way to explaining why liberal 
egalitarian theories see equality as primarily a ‘sovereign virtue’ that 
expresses the relationships that exist between members of a just political 
community and its structures of power and authority. In the absence of 
political society the issue of basic equality would not have the same 
significance. But one should not conclude from this that Rawls’ confines the 
                                                 
25 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev.edn., p. 442. 
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scope of equal recognition to fellow citizens. There are after all two basic 
features of moral personality, the capacity for a sense of justice is only one 
of them. All individuals share in the capacity for a conception of the good, 
and it is no doubt in virtue of this that some form of cosmopolitan harm 
principle can be constructed.  What is clear is that Rawls does not provide a 
simple answer to the issue of the scope of basic equality. At one level the 
capacity for a conception of the good is broad enough in range to encompass 
most of humanity. Yet at the level of a capacity for justice, it is not obvious 
that this entails relationships that are, at the political level, cosmopolitan in 
scope. The point here is not just one of a division of labour, but rather the 
more substantial claim that some of the relationships that count as part of 
being political equals are constituted by membership of the appropriate kind 
of political community, namely a state regulated by the two principle of 
justice.  This approach to basic equality is developed in Rawls’ later works 
such as A Law of Peoples, but even if one does not follow Rawls’ argument 
fully in this direction it is clear that he offers at best a ‘statist’ version of 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
What can we conclude from the above? Rawls does not provide the only 
possible route to the justification of a liberal egalitarian perspective, but his 
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approach to the issue of basic equality is insightful because it does not 
wholly marginalize the issue in the way that Dworkin’s rival theory of 
liberal egalitarianism appears to. Furthermore, Rawls’ theory connects the 
specification of basic equality to the context of a special form of political 
association but does not wholly subordinate equality to the issue of the 
internal structure of a just state.  In more general terms we can also see that 
whilst the defence of basic equality forms an important part of the defence of 
substantive egalitarian theories of distributive justice, one can overstate the 
importance of defending basic equality along the lines suggested by 
Waldron. Where this leaves us, is with a defence of the status quo in terms 
of how political philosophers should proceed. The analysis and critique of 
rival theories of egalitarianism has an important role in the wider defence of 
basic equality. What we should not expect is some theory independent 
account of a basic natural property in virtue of which people become moral 
equals, but neither should we lament the fact of the absence of such a 
property. The appeal to basic equality is important in making sense of the 
egalitarian project but the account of basic equality is not a straightforward 
first premise from which all else must be derived. It is a central part of the 
process of egalitarian argument in so far as it forces us to concentrate on the 
issue of the scope of our principles, and this is something that can be lost in 
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a preoccupation with issues such as the currency of egalitarian justice. But in 
making the defence of basic equality depend on the articulation of an 
egalitarian theory of the just political community we open up scope not only 
for philosophical arguments but also establish opportunities for other forms 
of political theorising to assist in providing representations of the core idea 
of basic equality and the forms of social relationships on which it depends.  
Although Waldron’s account of Locke proved to be unhelpful in providing 
the foundation of basic equality, perhaps there is scope for marshalling past 
historical thinkers and modes of thought in defending basic equality. Perhaps 
I could suggest Tom Paine. 
 
